It Takes a Village to Trust Science: Towards a (Thoroughly) Social Approach to Social Trust in Science by Contessa, Gabriele
 
This is the penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in Erkenntnis 
Please quote only from the published version 
Last Update: 22 October 2021 
Word Count: 11,512 
 
It Takes a Village to Trust Science: 
Towards a (Thoroughly) Social Approach to Public 










In this paper, I distinguish three general approaches to public trust in science, which I call the individual 
approach, the semi-social approach, and the social approach, and critically examine their proposed 
solutions to what I call the problem of harmful distrust. I argue that, despite their differences, the 
individual and the semi-social approaches see the solution to the problem of harmful distrust as 
consisting primarily in trying to persuade individual citizens to trust science and that both approaches 
face two general problems, which I call the problem of overidealizing science and the problem of 
overburdening citizens. I then argue that in order to avoid these problems we need to embrace a 
(thoroughly) social approach to public trust in science, which emphasizes the social dimensions of the 
reception, transmission, and uptake of scientific knowledge in society and the ways in which social 
forces influence both positively and negatively the trustworthiness of science. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Among academics and commentators, there is a growing sense that public trust in science and 
scientists is at a low ebb.1 While reports of the death of expertise (Nichols 2017) seem to be greatly 
exaggerated,2 it is undeniable that, in the United States (as well as in other countries), there are sizeable 
pockets of distrust in the scientific consensus on issues ranging from the contribution of human 
activity to climate change3 to the safety of vaccines.4 Given the social and environmental ramifications 
 
1 See, e.g., (Gawande 2016), (Tsipursky 2018), (Oreskes 2019), (Jewett 2020), and (Parikh 2021). 
2 For example, according to a 2019 Pew Research Centre survey, 86% of US adults have a great deal or fair amount of 
confidence in scientists acting in the best interests of the public (up from 76% in 2016 and compared to 57% for religious 
leaders, 47% for the news media, and 46% for business leaders (Funk et al. 2019)). 
3 For example, according to a Pew Research Center survey, 20% of US adults believe that human activity does not 
contribute too much or at all to climate change. The number goes up to 45% for conservative Republicans (as compared 
to 21% for moderate Republicans, 8% for moderate Democrats, and 2% for liberal Democrats) (Funk and Hefferon 2019). 
4 For example, 25% of respondents to a CBS News/YouGov Poll conducted in February 2021 said that they would 
not be getting the COVID-19 vaccine when it became available and 24% said that they might not get it (Salvanto et al. 
2021). There is a clear partisan divide among vaccine refusers, with 34% of Republicans and 30% of independents refusing 
to get the vaccine compared to only 10% of Democrats. Among those who might not or would not get the vaccine, some 
of the reasons given were that they did not trust the scientists and companies that make it (27%), that they never get 
vaccines (22%), and that they were not concerned about coronavirus (20%). 
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of some of these issues, the question of public trust in science has gained a new urgency. If a sizeable 
proportion of our fellow citizens do not believe in the reality of anthropogenic climate change or take 
its possible consequences seriously, how can we expect them to support the sort of social, political, 
and economic reforms required to prevent the worst-case scenarios? If people do not trust vaccines 
to be safe, how can we expect them to have their children vaccinated?  
To the extent to which distrust in science is both unwarranted and socially harmful (as it seems to 
be in the two cases just mentioned),5 it gives rise to what I call the problem of harmful distrust. In this 
paper, I discuss three general approaches to public trust in science and their proposed solutions to the 
problem of harmful distrust. In §2, I outline a general taxonomy of relationships of trust and use it to 
distinguish those three general approaches, which I call the individual approach, the semi-social approach, and 
the social approach. In §3 and §4, I critically examine, respectively, the individual approach and the semi-
social approach. I argue that, despite their differences, both approaches embrace individualistic 
solutions to the problem of harmful distrust and that, as a result, both approaches face two general 
problems, which I call the problem of overidealizing science and the problem of overburdening citizens. In §5, I 
argue that in order to avoid these problems we need to embrace a (thoroughly) social approach to 
public trust in science, which emphasizes the social dimensions of the reception, transmission, and 
uptake of scientific knowledge in society and the ways in which social forces influence both positively 
and negatively the trustworthiness of science and embraces social solutions to the problem of harmful 
distrust—in order to improve public trust in science, we need to improve what I call the socio-
epistemic infrastructure of society. 
2. THREE APPROACHES TO PUBLIC TRUST IN SCIENCE 
In this section, I sketch a general taxonomy of relationships of trust (or distrust) based on the 
occupants of the trustor and trustee positions and use it to distinguish three approaches to public trust 
in science.6 In what follows, I refer to the occupants of a trust relationship (i.e., ‘x (dis)trust y’) as, 
respectively the trustor and the trustee. So, for example, if Jane distrusts Joe, then Jane is the trustor and 
Joe is the trustee in that trust relationship.7 For the sake of simplicity, I first focus only on relationships 
of trust that have individuals or groups as their relata. This gives rise to four kinds of trust 
relationships—i.e.: 
1. individual-to-individual trust relationships (e.g., Jane might trust Donald Trump but distrust 
Hillary Clinton), 
 
5 It is important to note that distrust in science is not always necessarily socially harmful or unwarranted. For example, 
flat-eartherism might be a possible case of harmless distrust. While flat-earthers are clearly distrustful of science and scientists, 
their distrust might not be socially or politically harmful. A possible case of warranted distrust is distrust among social groups 
that have been (or still are) discriminated or stigmatized by the scientific establishment. For example, vaccine hesitancy 
seems to be high among African Americans (see, e.g., (Salvanto et al. 2021)). However, given the extent to which racism 
has shaped (and still shapes) the practice of medicine, this distrust does not seem to be unwarranted. More generally, as I 
argue later, the problematic relationship between certain areas of biomedical research and pharmaceutical companies seems 
to warrant a certain level of distrust in the latter. 
6 In what follows, I use ‘trust relationship’ to cover both relationship of trust and relationships of distrust. Distrust, as 
I understand it here, is not simply the absence of trust. It is an attitude akin to trust but with opposite valence (for a more 
detailed discussion of the relationship between the two, see (Hawley 2014)). 
7 Since this terminology applies also to cases of distrust, it is important to note that ‘the trustee’ does not necessarily 
refer to some entity that is trusted by the trustor. It only refers to an entity that is in a position to be trusted or distrusted 
by the trustor. 
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2. individual-to-group trust relationships (e.g., Jane might distrust politicians as a group (even if she 
might still trust specific politicians)), 
3. group-to-individual trust relationships (e.g., evangelicals might trust Donald Trump but distrust 
Hillary Clinton), and 
4. group-to-group trust relationships (e.g., evangelicals might distrust politicians in general (even if 
not all evangelicals distrust all politicians)). 
In addition to these four kinds of trust relationship, we can add trust relationship in which the 
trustee is an institution, which give us two additional kinds of trust relationship:8 
5. individual-to-institution trust relationships (e.g., Jane might trust the Supreme Court but distrust 
Congress), and 
6. group-to-institution trust relationships (e.g., evangelicals might trust the Supreme Court but 
might distrust Congress). 
In what follows, I use the label ‘individual trust relationships’ for trust relationships in which the trustor 
is an individual and ‘social trust relationships’ for those in which the trustor is a group. Also, I refer to 
trust relationships as ‘individual-oriented,’ ‘group-oriented,’ or ‘institution-oriented’ depending on the sort of 
entity that plays the role of the trustee in the relevant trust relationship. The taxonomy and its 
associated terminology are summarized in Table 1. 
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Once we look at the question of public trust in science through the lens of the above taxonomy, it 
becomes apparent that it is possible to understand public trust in science in a number of different 
ways. Here, we can focus on two crucial distinctions. The first (and, for our purposes, the most crucial) 
distinction is the one between approaches that understand public trust in science as, primarily, an 
individual trust relationship (i.e., the individual and the semi-social approaches) and approaches that 
conceive of it as, primarily, a social trust relationship (i.e., the social approach, which I defend in this 
paper). One of the main differences between these approaches is that, according to the individual and 
the semi-social approaches, social trust in science depends on (and is explained by) individual trust in 
science, while the reverse is true of the social approach. As a first approximation, the individual and 
the semi-social approaches maintain certain societies (and certain social groups within them) (dis)trust 
science (or scientists) because their members tend to (dis)trust science (or scientists), while the social 
approach maintains individuals tend to (dis)trust science (or scientists) because they belong to societies 
(or to specific social groups within them) in which (dis)trust in science is prevalent. One of the most 
important consequences of these two different understandings of public trust in science is that they 
suggest different solutions to the problem of harmful distrust. The individual approach and the semi-
social approach tend to favor individualistic solutions to the problem of harmful distrust (i.e., solutions 
 
8 While institutions can also be trustors, I ignore this possibility here. 
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at the individual level), while the social approach tends to favor social solutions (i.e., solutions at the 
social level). 
The second crucial distinction is the one between approaches that understand public trust in 
science as, primarily, individual-oriented (as the individual approach) and those that understand it as, 
primarily, institution-oriented (as the semi-social and the social approaches).9 According to the 
individual approach, institution-oriented trust depends on (and is explained by) individual-oriented 
trust, while the reverse is true for the social and the semi-social approaches. As a first approximation, 
the individual approach maintains people trust science only insofar as they trust individual scientists, 
while the semi-social and the social approaches maintain that people trust individual scientists only 
insofar as they trust science as an institution (and they see the individual scientist as acting as a 
spokesperson for that institution). 
Somewhat schematically, we can thus summarize the main differences between the three 
approaches as follows. The individual approach conceives of public trust in science as, primarily, an 
individual-to-individual trust relationship—i.e., as a trust between individual citizens and individual 
scientists. The semi-social approach conceives of public trust in science as, primarily, an individual-
to-institution trust relationship—i.e., a trust relationship between individual citizens and the 
institutions of science. Finally, the social approach understands it as, primarily, a group-to-institution 
trust relationship—i.e., a trust relationship between society in general (and certain social groups within 
society in particular) and the institutions of science. On each of these approaches, other forms of trust 
in science depend on (and can be explained in terms of) what the account takes to be the fundamental 
trust relationship. In the next three sections, I discuss each of these approaches in turn. 
3. THE INDIVIDUAL APPROACH 
As we have seen in the previous section, the individual approach understands public trust in science 
as, primarily, a trust relationship between individual citizens and individual scientists. Perhaps, the 
simplest version of the individual approach is what we might call the naïve account of public trust in 
science. According to the naïve account, ordinary citizens should trust scientists because (individual) 
scientists are disinterested and objective seekers of the truth who follow the scientific method, which 
is the most reliable way to establish the truth about that domain. While, to my knowledge, nobody 
nowadays explicitly accepts (let alone defends) the naïve account, something along its lines seems to 
be still popular among scientists and the general (trustful) public. 
One of the theses of this paper is that accounts of public trust in science tend to face two general 
problems, which I call, respectively, the problem of overidealizing science and the problem of overburdening citizens. 
The naïve account faces a particularly severe version of the problem of overidealizing science. This is 
because the naïve account it relies on a picture of science which, nowadays, is almost universally 
rejected by science scholars, and which we might call the naïve view of science. Since the challenges to the 
naïve view of science are well-known, I only mention the three most relevant for our purposes here. 
The first challenge is that the task of explaining exactly what the scientific method is has proven 
exceptionally difficult, so difficult that today most philosophers of science seem to have given up 
entirely on the project of identifying a set of principles that are both sufficiently informative and 
sufficiently general to deserve the honorary title of ‘scientific method.’ The second challenge is that 
 
9 A third distinction that is important but that will not be explored in detail in this paper is the one between accounts 
that conceive of public trust in science as, primarily, group-oriented and accounts that conceive of it as, primarily, 
institution-oriented. The question, in other words, is whether people trust scientists because they trust science or vice versa. 
While this is an interesting question, it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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scientists who have access to the same body of empirical evidence often seem to disagree with each 
other about which theory or hypothesis is best supported by the available evidence. These 
disagreements seem to suggest that, even if there is such a thing as the scientific method, either it is 
not applied correctly by all scientists, or it does not yield univocal results. The third challenge is that 
the picture of individual scientists as objective and disinterested truth-seekers is, at best, highly 
unrealistic. Since the 1960s, a growing body of work in the history and sociology of science has clearly 
established that individual scientists are susceptible to the influence of non-epistemic values (such as 
foibles, idiosyncrasies, social prejudices, personal, political, or economic interests, or metaphysical or 
religious views) and that these non-epistemic values often affect their scientific decisions.10 This third 
challenge seems to be particularly worrisome at a time when the direct and indirect influence of private 
funding on science is growing and it is increasingly common for scientists to operate under more or 
less open forms of conflict of interest. 
In light of these challenges, supporters of the individualist approach are likely to reject the naïve 
account (and the naïve view of science on which it relies). However, if they do so, they seem to run 
into the second of the general problems I mentioned above—i.e., the problem of overburdening 
citizens. If one accepts the individual approach without assuming that scientists are always and 
everywhere disinterested and objective truth-seekers that dispassionately apply the scientific method, 
then the relationship between scientists and ordinary citizens is similar to the relationships between 
other non-disinterested experts (e.g., mechanics or lawyers) and their clients, which tend to give rise 
to what Alexander Guerrero (2016) calls strategic expertise contexts. Let me call the resulting version of 
the individual approach the consultative account of public trust in science. The consultative account faces a 
number of problems that characterize strategic expertise contexts in general. Since these problems are 
well-known, I only mention two of them here. The first is the problem of how non-experts can 
(without acquiring a significant level of expertise themselves) distinguish the genuine experts on a 
certain topic from pseudo-experts, quacks, and charlatans; the second is the problem of how non-
experts can (again, without acquiring a significant level of expertise) decide whom to believe in cases 
of disagreement among genuine experts. 11 While it is possible to find a number of attempts to mitigate 
the problems that arise from strategic expertise contexts, most of these attempts seem to be based on 
unrealistic expectations about the (epistemic and non-epistemic) resources that ordinary citizens are 
both willing and able to devote to ascertaining who the genuine experts are or who to believe among 
disagreeing experts.12 
The individual approach, thus, seems to be caught between two sets of unrealistic expectations. 
On the one hand, the naïve account seems to rely too heavily on the objectivity and disinterestedness 
of individual scientists and on the existence of a set of unambiguous norms that deserve the honorary 
title of ‘the scientific method’ (which is an instance of what I have called the problem of overidealizing 
science). On the other hand, the consultative account seems to rely too heavily on the limited resources 
of ordinary citizens to settle disagreements between (genuine or self-proclaimed) experts (which is an 
instance of the problem of overburdening citizens). 
 
10 On the influence of social prejudices on science, see, e.g., (Lloyd 2005) or (Gould 2006). On the influence of 
economic interests on science, see, e.g., (Angell 2005) and (Oreskes and Conway 2010). 
11 See, e.g., (Goldman 2001). 
12 For a critical review of some of the literature on the relationship between non-disinterested experts and their clients, 
see (Guerrero 2016). 
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4. THE SEMI-SOCIAL APPROACH 
If the individual approach understands public trust in science as, primarily, based on a trust 
relationship between individual citizens and individual scientists, the semi-social approach understands 
it as, primarily, based on a trust relationship between individual citizens and science.  
The semi-social approach typically rejects the naïve view of science in favor of what we might call 
a social view of science. The social view of science meets the challenges that beset the naïve view by 
adopting something along the line of the following three-step strategy. The first step is to distinguish 
the goals of science from the goals of individual scientists. Even if individual scientists have their own 
personal goals (such as professional success), these goals can be harnessed in the pursuit of the goals 
of science. Scientists know that, insofar as they want to be professionally successful, they need to act 
so as to promote the goals of science as their own goals and they have to act in accordance with the 
ethical and epistemic norms of the scientific community.13 The second step is to adopt a broadly 
pragmatic understanding of the goals of science. As a society, we might be content if science can 
provide us with reliable knowledge that can be used to pursue our personal and collective goals with 
a reasonable degree of success (i.e., with a greater degree of success than relying on common sense, 
intuitions, or divination).14 The third step is to maintain that, insofar as there is anything that deserves 
the label ‘scientific method,’ it is best understood as a set of social norms that regulate the activities of 
the scientific community as a whole (rather than a set of normative principles to which individual 
scientists adhere). On this view, the scientific method can be understood as a social system of epistemic 
checks and balances whose function is to safeguard the reliability of scientific results. For example, 
scientific communities rely on mechanisms such as peer-review or replication to deter unscrupulous 
scientists from trying to game the system and they apply very severe sanctions to those scientists who 
are found to have violated those norms. 
One of the most popular versions of the social view of science is the one proposed by Helen 
Longino.15 According to Longino, a scientific community is objective to the extent to which it meets 
certain conditions, which include sharing a set of standards, displaying a level of social and epistemic 
diversity, granting comparable epistemic authority to all of its members in good standing 
(irrespectively of their professional status or social identity), providing recognized avenues for 
criticism of theories, assumptions, and methods, and engaging with those criticisms (as opposed to 
merely ignoring them or side-lining their proponents) (see, in particular, (Longino 1990, chap. 4)). 
The semi-social approach to public trust in science builds on the social view of science by claiming 
that, while one cannot necessarily assume that individual scientists are disinterested and objective 
truth-seekers, the scientific community as a whole can be trusted to pursue the goals that society 
expects it to pursue (whether it is truth or some lesser goal, such as empirical adequacy). The most 
popular variant of the semi-social approach to public trust in science is what we might call the consensus 
account of public trust in science (which is more or less explicitly embraced by Naomi Oreskes (2019) and 
Elizabeth Anderson (2011)).16 According to the consensus account, the consensus of the relevant 
 
13 Note that none of the above requires denying that many or even most scientists wholeheartedly adopt the goals of 
science as their own, independently of their other goals. The point is rather that it is not necessary for scientists to be 
disinterested truth-seekers for them to pursue the goals of science (whatever these might be). 
14 If, as a by-product, science can also provide us with some understanding of what the world is like or satisfy our 
intellectual curiosity, then all the better for it. 
15 See, in particular, (Longino 1990). For other prominent versions the social view of science, see (Hull 1988), (Kitcher 
1993), and (Solomon 2001). 
16 I should note that neither Anderson nor Oreskes embrace the consensus account as I outline it here. First, both 
authors include elements of what I called the consultative account in their respective accounts. Second, both Anderson 
and Oreskes identify a number of additional criteria for lay acceptance beside the consensus of the scientific community. 
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scientific community over a certain hypothesis is a sufficient (and, possibly, necessary) condition for 
ordinary citizens to be justified in accepting (or rejecting) that hypothesis. For example, Anderson 
writes:  
Science needs a balance of diverse inquirers to formulate and investigate a wide range of hypotheses, 
uncover a wide range of relevant evidence, and check one another’s biases […]. When the vast majority 
of diverse inquirers converge on certain conclusions, as in evolutionary theory, a robust scientific 
consensus obtains. Before a consensus, the best course for laypersons is to suspend judgment. Once a 
consensus of trustworthy experts is consolidated, laypersons are well advised to accept the consensus 
even in the face of a handful of dissenting scientists, or a few instances of error or dishonesty among a 
few of the participants in the consensus. (Anderson 2011, 149) 
The consensus account explicitly formulates one of the implicit premises of an argument that is 
often deployed in the context of public debates about anthropogenic climate change (and whose use 
was spearheaded by Oreskes herself (Oreskes 2004)). The argument appeals to the fact that a vast 
majority of climate scientists believe in anthropogenic climate change, as testified by the fact that, 
according to an oft-quoted study, 97% of peer-reviewed climate science papers support anthropogenic 
climate change (Cook et al. 2013). That argument, however, does not provide us with any explicit 
reason to think that the consensus of the relevant scientific community over the anthropogenicity of 
climate change gives ordinary citizens reasons to accept that hypothesis and, on the face of it, it is not 
obvious that we should do so. After all, as Stephen John (2018, 76–77) notes, the fact that astrologers 
unanimously believe the hypothesis that a Jupiter-Saturn conjunction ushers in the Age of Aquarius 
does not seem to be a reason to accept that hypothesis. According to the consensus account, however, 
the missing premise is that, given the system of epistemic checks and balances implemented by the 
community of climate scientists, the fact that that community has reached a nearly unanimous 
consensus over a certain hypothesis after subjecting it (and its main alternatives) to critical examination 
gives ordinary citizens a strong (if defeasible) reason to accept that hypothesis. In contrast, the 
astrological community does not seem to have any system of epistemic checks and balances in place.17 
On the face of it, the consensus account seems to avoid the problems that beset the individual 
approach. On the one hand, it seems to avoid the problem of overidealizing science by adopting a 
more realistic view of science. On the other hand, it seems to sidestep the problem of overburdening 
citizens by relying on a seemingly simple criterion (i.e., the consensus of the relevant scientific 
community) for lay acceptance of scientific hypotheses. 
On closer scrutiny, however, the consensus account turns out to be vulnerable to different versions 
of the same problems. Like the naïve account, it, too, seems to presuppose an excessively idealized 
 
For example, in addition to scientific consensus, Anderson’s account requires scientific experts to display what she calls 
dialogic rationality and to have the right sort of qualifications and Oreskes’s account includes four additional criteria, which 
she labels ‘method,’ ‘evidence’, ‘values,’ and ‘humility.’ In this paper, I focus on a pure version of the consensus account, 
as the focus on consensus is what makes the consensus account a semi-social account and differentiates it from the 
consultative account. Moreover, many of my criticisms of their accounts would apply mutatis mutandis to the additional 
criteria in Anderson’s and Oreskes’ respective accounts. For example, if, as I argue below, it is unreasonable to expect 
ordinary citizens to be willing and able to devote their epistemic and non-epistemic resources to determine whether a 
sufficiently broad consensus holds in the relevant community, then it is also unreasonable to expect them to be willing 
and able to devote their epistemic resources to determine whether certain experts display dialogic irrationality or the 
appropriate level of epistemic humility. Finally, I should note that the consensus account is only one version of the semi-
social account. For example, as I interpret it, the idiosyncrasy-free account of public trust in science proposed in (Boulicault 
and Schroeder 2021) is a semi-social account that does not rely on the notion of scientific consensus. As far as I can see, 
many of the objections to the consensus account would also apply mutatis mutandis to the idiosyncrasy-free account. 
However, for reasons of space I cannot discuss that account here. 
17 While, pace Popper, astrologers do seem to make falsifiable predictions, they do not seem to engage in a collective 
effort to keep track of and check each other’s predictions for accuracy or to revise their theories in light of false predictions. 
IT TAKES A VILLAGE TO TRUST SCIENCE 8 
picture of the workings of real-world scientific communities (which gives rise to a version of the 
problem of the overidealizing science) and, like the consultative account, it too seems to rely 
excessively on the resources of ordinary citizens (which gives rise to a version of the problem of 
overburdening citizens). The relevant version of the problem of overidealizing science is that it is not 
clear how closely real-world scientific communities approximate the ideal of an objective scientific 
community that underlies social views of science such as Longino’s.18 Just to pick one facet of this 
problem, consider cases of what we might call vicious consensus. The history of science shows that 
scientific communities can achieve a significant level of consensus over false hypotheses, a consensus 
that seems to be based more on the shared prejudices and biases then on the empirical support for 
those hypotheses. A classic example of vicious consensus is the broad consensus among 19th-century 
physical anthropologists over the hypothesis that there are innate differences in intelligence between 
members of different “races.”19 Cases of vicious consensus seem to show that the prevalence of 
prejudices and biases in a scientific community can severely inhibit the effectiveness of the self-
correcting mechanisms presupposed by the social view of science. Given that all sorts of implicit or 
explicit prejudices and biases (including racist, sexist, and classist prejudices) are still widespread in 
contemporary societies, it is unlikely that our scientific communities are completely immune from 
their influence.20 
Unsurprisingly, Oreskes, who is an accomplished historian of science, anticipates this objection. 
Her response to it is that ‘in all cases [of vicious consensus], there was significant, important and 
empirically informed dissent within the scientific community’ (Oreskes 2019, 128; emphasis in the original). Even 
if, for the sake of the argument, we grant the truth of Oreskes’ broad claim, this response seems to 
give rise to a dilemma. Either the consensus account adopts unanimity as the criterion of lay 
acceptance, or it adopts a less stringent criterion. If it adopts unanimity, then it is likely that this 
criterion will be rarely met even in cases of virtuous consensus, as scientific communities rarely achieve 
full unanimity over any interesting scientific hypothesis. Moreover, from the perspective of social 
views of science, this lack of unanimity is to be encouraged, as scientific disagreement is what fuels 
the self-correcting mechanisms of science. Finally, it is not obvious that unanimity would actually help 
to foster trust in science, as outsiders might worry that the apparent consensus is based on the 
suppression of dissent.21 However, if the consensus account adopts a less stringent criterion for lay 
acceptance, then Oreskes’ response fails to distinguish between vicious and virtuous consensus, as, in 
both cases, the consensus is likely to be less-than-unanimous. Advocates of the consensus account 
would therefore have to identify additional criteria to distinguish cases of (less-than-unanimous) 
virtuous consensus from cases of (less-than-unanimous) vicious consensus and it is unclear what these 
criteria might be (see, e.g., (de Melo-Martín and Intemann 2018)). Moreover, as Oreskes and her co-
author Erick Conway have abundantly demonstrated (Oreskes and Conway 2010), even in cases of 
virtuous and near-unanimous consensus, it only takes a handful of highly motivated, unscrupulous, 
 
18 A view on which Oreskes (2019, 49–54) explicitly relies. 
19 See, e.g., (Tucker 1994) and (Gould 2006). 
20 For example, as feminist science scholars haver persuasively argued, sexist prejudices still underlie much 
contemporary scientific research (see, e.g., (Lloyd 2005) or (Fine 2011)). 
21 It is unclear whether and to what extent the perception of a scientific consensus over a certain hypothesis leads to 
lay acceptance. While there is some empirical evidence that perception of a scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate 
change is correlated with belief in anthropogenic climate change (see, e.g., (van der Linden et al. 2015), (van der Linden, 
Leiserowitz, and Maibach 2018)), the strength of that correlation has been questioned (Kahan 2017). More importantly, it 
is unclear what causal structure gives rise to that correlation, as there is some evidence that people’s perception of the level 
of scientific consensus is affected by their beliefs and their values (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman 2011), which 
suggests that people who are less likely to believe in climate change (on political or religious grounds) are also less likely 
to perceive a consensus among the scientists.  
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and outspoken scientists to mislead the general public into believing that a certain hypothesis is 
scientifically controversial.22 Oreskes might reply that these cases are not cases of empirically informed 
dissent. However, the task of distinguishing cases of spurious dissent from the sort of genuine dissent 
that, according to the social view, drives the self-correcting mechanisms of science is far from a simple 
task (see, e.g., (de Melo-Martín and Intemann 2018)). Moreover, even assuming, for the sake of the 
argument, that supporters of the consensus account could provide the general public with a set of 
more specific criteria to distinguish between virtuous and vicious consensus and between spurious 
and genuine dissent, the consensus account would still run into the problem of overburdening citizens. 
It seems unrealistic to expect ordinary citizens to have the (epistemic and non-epistemic) resources to 
apply any such hypothetical set of criteria to every single case ranging from the reality of anthropogenic 
climate change to the safety of vaccines. 
It is important to note that these two problems are not specific to Oreskes’ particular version of 
the consensus account—they seem to be a consequence of two general features of the semi-social 
approach. The semi-social approach seems to presuppose that the problem of harmful distrust is 
primarily the problem of persuading individual citizens that science is a trustworthy institution. 
However, there seem to be two general problems with this. The first is that it is far from obvious that 
science as it is currently practiced is fully trustworthy (which is, once again, an instance of the general 
problem of overidealizing science). Just to focus on one facet of this problem for illustrative purposes, 
it seems that science’s current system of external and internal incentives is not always best suited to 
promoting the goals that society expects it to achieve. As far as external incentives are concerned, 
science is increasingly reliant on private sources of funding (whether directly or indirectly).23 A field in 
which the pernicious effects of this reliance on private funding are particularly obvious is biomedical 
research. As James Robert Brown (2017) has argued, private funding influences biomedical research 
negatively in two ways—it biases it (as it creates a conflict of interest for the researchers, who are 
funded by the very corporations that stand to gain or lose financially from their research),24 and it 
skews it (as it promotes certain research directions (such as, e.g., development of new patentable drugs) 
over others (such as, e.g., research on off-label uses of old drugs, non-pharmaceutical interventions, 
or lifestyle changes) on the basis of considerations of profitability). The influence of private funding 
in biomedical research has resulted in a number of notorious scandals that have contributed to 
tarnishing the public’s perception of the trustworthiness of biomedical research in particular and of 
science in general.25 
 
22 In fact, recent work in social epistemology shows that it is not even necessary to rely on self-interested scientists to 
generate the perception of a lack of consensus. A propagandist can create the appearance of dissent just by cherry-picking 
the results that best fit their purposes (see, e.g., (Weatherall, O’Connor, and Bruner forthcoming)). 
23 According to OECD estimates, in most countries, the business sector expenditures on research and development 
(R&D) account for 60% of total R&D expenditures against 20% by universities and 10% by governments (OECD 2015, 
159). On the potential of conflict of interest to undermine public trust in science, see, e.g., (Elliott 2014) and (Almassi 
2017). 
24 For a qualitative review of the biasing influence of pharmaceutical funding on biomedical research, see (Sismondo 
2008). 
25 According to a Pew Research Center survey, while 74% of US adults have a mostly positive view of medical doctors 
only 68% have a mostly positive view of research scientists in the biomedical sciences; only 35% believe that biomedical 
researchers care about people’s best interests (as opposed to 57% for doctors), only 32% that biomedical researchers 
provide fair and accurate information (as opposed to 48% for doctors), only 15% believe that biomedical researchers and 
doctors are transparent about conflict of interest, and, finally, only 12% believe that biomedical researchers admit and take 
responsibility for their mistakes (a similar percentage (13%) believe the same of doctors) (Funk et al. 2019). For a social-
epistemological discussion of one of these scandals, see (Biddle 2007). For popular books on the negative influence of 
private funding on biomedical research, see (Angell 2005) and (Goldacre 2012); for a discussion of how conflict of interest 
erodes trust in science, see, e.g., (Friedman 2002) and (Goldenberg 2016). 
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The internal incentives of scientific communities, however, can also contribute to skewing and 
biasing their research. Consider, for example, the replication crisis that has recently engulfed social 
psychology. The crisis originated with a large-scale attempt to replicate some of the most influential 
results in social psychology, which resulted in a failure to replicate the results of most of the original 
studies.26 Of the many factors that are likely to have contributed to the crisis, one factor illustrates 
particularly clearly both the biasing and skewing effects of the internal incentives (and disincentives) 
adopted by the community. Scientific communities tend to have a preference for surprising results, 
which means that such results are more likely to get published and cited, with all that this entails in 
terms of professional prestige and academic career. This contributes both to biasing research (as 
researchers have an incentive to actively search the data for surprising results that might, in fact, be 
just an artefact of poor experimental design or a statistical fluke) and to skewing it (as replication 
studies are considered much less prestigious than original studies).27 The replicability of scientific 
results is considered a cornerstone of the scientific method. However, replicability without replication 
is unlikely to serve the self-correcting function it is supposed to serve, and it is unlikely that the 
scientific community as it is currently organized will achieve the optimal balance between finding 
surprising results and probing the robustness and replicability of those results.28 
While the semi-social approach rightly emphasizes how the norms adopted by scientific 
communities can function as a system of epistemic checks and balances, it seems to largely ignore the 
fact that scientific communities do not operate fully independently from society and that the norms 
they currently adopt are not always best suited to the achievement of the goals of science. In particular, 
the semi-social approach fails to openly acknowledge that the trustworthiness of science as an 
institution is partly shaped by external and internal social forces and that these forces often limit the 
ability of science to self-regulate so as to be fully trustworthy. Moreover, by discounting the fact that 
science as it is currently practiced is not always fully trustworthy, the semi-social account fails to 
address some of the legitimate concerns that fuel distrust in science in certain sectors of the public. 
An adequate account of public trust in science should acknowledge that, as it is currently practiced, 
science is not always fully trustworthy and should develop proposals to improve the trustworthiness 
of science rather than simply presupposing it. As philosophers working on trust often note (see, e.g., 
(Hardin 2006)), trust is not intrinsically good, as we should not fully trust those who are not fully 
trustworthy. While, overall, science might be more trustworthy than many other institutions, it does 
not mean that an account of public trust in science should ignore the ways in which its trustworthiness 
can be improved. 
The second general problem with the semi-social approach stems from its oddly divided 
epistemology. The semi-social approach seems to presuppose that it is social epistemology for 
scientists but individualistic epistemology for everyone else. While it correctly emphasizes the social 
dimensions of the production of knowledge within the scientific community, it primarily relies on an 
inadequate individualistic picture of the reception, transmission, and uptake of that knowledge by 
society, a picture that relies almost exclusively on individual citizens (which, again, leads to an instance 
of the problem of overburdening citizens). As a result, the semi-social approach largely ignores the 
social dimensions of the reception, transmission, and uptake of that knowledge.29  
 
26 For an overview of the replication crisis and some of the philosophical issues it raises, see (Romero 2019). See also 
Jon Krosnick’s reply to Oreskes’ lectures (Krosnick 2019). 
27 See, e.g., (Romero 2017). 
28 For a discussion of some of these issues, see (Romero forthcoming). For a more general assessment of the desirability 
of the peer-review system, see (Heesen and Bright Forthcoming). 
29 For an overview of the social dimensions of the reception, transmission, and uptake of scientific knowledge, see, 
e.g., (O’Connor and Weatherall 2019). 
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Let me focus on one specific facet of this problem to illustrate the general problem. The problem 
arises from the communication channels between science and the general public. Most people do not 
get their scientific information directly (e.g., from scientists or scientific institutions) but indirectly 
through traditional media and, increasingly, through social media (see, e.g., (Funk et al. 2019). This 
gives rise to a number of issues that the semi-social approach is ill-equipped to address. Let me 
mention one issue here, which concerns the effectiveness of trying to persuade citizens who are 
distrustful of science of its trustworthiness. The problem is that, to some extent, we all live in an 
epistemic bubble that largely determines what information (and, even more critically, misinformation) 
reaches us. This includes not only scientific (mis)information but also the very attempts to persuade 
distrustful citizens of the trustworthiness of science, which means that it is, at best, doubtful that the 
attempts to persuade distrustful citizens will even reach their targets. Even worse, many distrustful 
citizens seem to be part of echo chambers that actively undermine the credibility of outside sources.30 
In light of these considerations, it is likely that the sort of persuasion attempts advocated by semi-
social approach are likely to be ineffective (in the case of epistemic bubbles) or counterproductive (in 
the case of echo chambers).31 
In the next section, I argue that, in order to overcome these two general problems with the semi-
social approach, we need to embrace a thoroughly social approach to public trust in science, one that 
understands both the production of scientific knowledge and its reception and uptake by society as 
thoroughly social and that sees science as completely embedded in society and dependent on it to 
improve its trustworthiness. 
5. THE SOCIAL APPROACH 
In this section, I argue that, in order to avoid the problems faced by the individual and semi-social 
approaches, we need to adopt a (thoroughly) social approach to public trust in science. The outline of 
the social approach that I sketch here is admittedly incomplete and underdeveloped. The details will 
need to be worked out elsewhere (and, in some cases, they are already being worked out).32 However, 
I hope that, in spite of its limitations, the outline that I sketch here can help lay the groundwork for a 
unified social approach to public trust in science that weaves together a number of strands of research 
on the social epistemology of science broadly construed, stimulate more work in this direction, and, 
hopefully, promote the development of different and more effective solutions to the problem of 
harmful distrust. 
The social approach rejects the two assumptions that underlie the semi-social approach and that, I 
claimed, were at the root of its problems. First, the social approach rejects the divided epistemology 
presupposed by the semi-social approach in favor of a unified social epistemology, one that 
 
30 For the distinction between epistemic bubbles and echo chambers, see (Nguyen 2020). 
31 To be fair, both Anderson and Oreskes acknowledge the influence of social factors on the beliefs of individual 
citizens (and, in fact, Anderson explicitly discusses the issue of news media as a source of scientific misinformation). 
However, in spite of this, their accounts are still not (thoroughly) social, as they still understand public trust in science as, 
primarily, based on a trust relationship between individual citizens and the scientific community and it regards social factors 
as interfering with the otherwise voluntary and rational epistemic choices of individual citizens. 
32 Although, to my knowledge, the social approach to public trust in science that I sketch here has not been explicitly 
defended, there are many similarities between my account and the views on public trust in science developed by feminist 
epistemologists and philosophers of science (see, e.g., (Scheman 2001), (Grasswick 2010), and (Grasswick 2014)). 
Moreover, many contributions to the literature on neighbouring topics presuppose a social approach to public trust in 
science or develop and defend aspects of the general account sketched here (see, e.g., (Moore 2017), (de Melo-Martín and 
Intemann 2018), and (Goldenberg 2021)). This paper aspires to sketch a general framework in which all these different 
strands of research can be weaved together. 
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acknowledges the social dimensions of not only the production of scientific knowledge by the 
scientific community but also its reception, transmission, and uptake by the rest of society. According 
to the social approach, it is social epistemology for all. Second, the social approach rejects the semi-
social approach’s implicit assumption that science is largely insulated from society and that it is already 
fully trustworthy as it is currently practiced. According to the social approach, science is fully 
embedded in society and, as a result, society can affect both positively and negatively to the 
trustworthiness of science. 
As we have seen in §2, the social approach conceives of public trust in science as, primarily, based 
on a trust relationship between society (and various social groups within it) and the scientific 
community. Of course, to say that trust in science is primarily based on group trust is not to deny that 
social groups trust science only insofar as a suitable proportion of their members trusts science. Rather, 
it is to deny that members of the group come to trust or distrust science independently of one another. 
One of the most distinctive characteristics of a social approach to public trust in science is that, while 
individualist and semi-social approach conceive of individual trust in science as, primarily, the result 
of a rational and voluntary decision made by each individual citizen independently of one another, the 
social approach conceives of individual trust in science as the result of a habit that is neither fully 
voluntary nor fully rational and that it is largely the result of the attitudes towards science held by 
those in one’s social and epistemic network. 
As we have seen, according to the individual and semi-social approaches, individual citizens should 
trust science because science is a reliable source of knowledge and, if they do not trust science, they 
need to be persuaded that science is trustworthy. On these accounts, the solution to the problem of 
harmful distrust requires educating individual citizens about science and persuading them to trust 
science. Even when semi-social approach acknowledges the influence of social factors, they still see 
them as, primarily, interfering with the otherwise rational and voluntary decisions of individual 
citizens. 
The social approach, on the other hand, conceives of trust in science as, primarily, social and it 
maintains that attempts to solve the problem distrust should focus primarily on social and structural 
changes rather than on interventions at the individual level. Consider, for example, the extreme case 
of someone (let’s call him Aaron) who grew up in a traditionalist religious community that denounces 
science as inimical to religion and as a gateway to atheism and who, as a result, is distrustful of science. 
For Aaron, distrust in science is a profoundly held attitude and it is unlikely that people or institutions 
from outside Aaron’s community could persuade Aaron to trust science. In fact, as we have seen, any 
efforts to persuade Aaron are likely to be ineffective if not counterproductive (if they even reach him). 
Of course, this does not mean that it is impossible for Aaron to bring himself to trust science. Rather, 
it means that bringing himself to trust science for Aaron would require a concerted and conscious 
effort that we cannot expect him to be motivated to make insofar as he is a full member of a 
community that is profoundly distrustful of science.  
Admittedly, the case of Aaron might be an extreme case.33 However, according to social approach, 
the difference is a matter of degree—whether individuals trust (or distrust) science is, by and large, a 
function of the trust in science in their social environment and their epistemic network. This 
contention is indirectly supported by the evidence. For example, while science is a global institution, 
distrust in science seems to vary from country to country (see, e.g., (Wellcome Global Monitor 2018)) 
and, within a specific country, from social group to social group (see, e.g., (Funk et al. 2019)). These 
 
33 However, if, as Thi Nguyen (2020) persuasively argues, escaping an echo chamber is as epistemically difficult as 
escaping a religious cult, then the difference between Aaron and other citizens who are distrustful of science might be a 
matter of degree. As Aaron’s community as I have described it does seem to have the characteristics of an echo chamber 
and so do many of the communities that foster distrust in science. 
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variations suggest that public trust in science is largely a social and cultural phenomenon. Moreover, 
if one is part of a social group (or a society) that (dis)trusts science, a number of social and cognitive 
mechanisms are likely to contribute to entrench that (dis)trust,34 and it is difficult for external forces 
to change that. 
But what does it mean for a society (or a social group) to trusts science? I think that it is important 
to emphasize that a society that trusts science is not necessarily one whose members have a positive 
opinion of science or scientists. A society can trust science without most of its members having any 
explicit views about the trustworthiness of science or scientists—a society that trusts science is, first 
and foremost, a society that collectively relies on science to inform its actions and decisions (and those 
of its members). Public trust in science can be understood as a collective (non-doxastic) disposition 
(Kappel 2014) or as a collective (unquestioning) attitude (Nguyen forthcoming) toward science. 
Whenever the question of whether we should trust science arises, then, usually, trust in science has 
already been eroded to some extent. On this view, full trust is (typically)35 implicit trust. As Annette 
Baier aptly put it: ‘We inhabit a climate of trust as we inhabit an atmosphere and notice it as we notice 
air, only when it becomes scarce or polluted.’ (Baier 1986, 234) Consider an analogy. If a friend invites 
you for dinner, you implicitly trust that they will not poison you. The question of whether they have 
poisoned your food should not even cross your mind. If the question were to genuinely cross your 
mind, then that would be evidence that you don’t fully trust your friend. 
On the social account, a society that trusts science is not necessarily one in which the citizens have 
a positive opinion of science or scientists. But, if trust in science is not necessarily exemplified by the 
explicit opinions of citizens what does it consist in? According to the social account, a society trusts 
science insofar as it exemplifies an efficient division of epistemic labor between scientists and ordinary 
citizens. As social epistemologists argue, a significant degree of division of epistemic labor is essential 
to the functioning of any society and, particularly, to that of contemporary societies. A society that 
exemplifies a perfectly efficient division of epistemic labor is one in which people rely on the 
knowledge of the relevant experts for their individual and collective decisions. They rely on the 
knowledge of mechanics to determine what’s wrong with their cars and on the knowledge of doctors 
to diagnose their medical conditions. A society that trusts science is one that collectively relies on the 
knowledge of climate scientists to settle the question of whether human activity is causing climate 
change and on the knowledge of biomedical researchers to settle the question whether vaccines are 
safe. 
Obviously, there are both theoretical and practical limits to how closely real-world societies can (or 
should) approximate a perfectly efficient division of epistemic labor. Let me mention two here. A first 
limit arises from the state of what we might call the socio-epistemic infrastructure of society. Many experts 
offer their services through the market, and this might give rise to conflicts of interest between experts 
and their clients (e.g., a mechanic might recommend a more expensive repair when a cheaper one 
would be equally effective, a lawyer might recommend litigation even when settling would be in the 
client’s best interest). The extent to which a society can approximate a perfectly efficient division of 
cognitive labor is largely determined by the quality of its socio-epistemic infrastructure. The social 
approach has a very broad understanding of what counts as part of the socio-epistemic infrastructure. 
 
34 For a review of the empirical evidence of “social contagion” with regards to attitudes about vaccines, see 
(Konstantinou et al. 2021). A variety of hypotheses has been suggested to explain this form of social contagion (for a 
discussion and an attempt to settle this debate, see (Kahan 2013)). One hypothesis is that the social contagion is due to 
cognitive biases, such as conformity bias (which has been the focus of a lot of work in social psychology since (Asch 
1951)). Another hypothesis is that the contagion is due to identity-protective motivated reasoning—i.e., the tendency of 
individuals to form beliefs that conform with the ideological or cultural values shared with their social group(s) (see, e.g., 
(Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman 2011)). 
35 Although this is not always necessarily the case (see, e.g., (Keren 2019)). 
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For example, the social approach would include a country’s healthcare system in its socio-epistemic 
infrastructure, as many of the potential conflicts of interest that might arise in the relationship between 
doctors and their patients in the context of a private or semi-private health care systems do not arise 
in the context of a fully public healthcare systems. Similarly, a society in which scientific research is 
primarily funded privately is a society that has a poor socio-epistemic infrastructure that tends to 
undermine trust in science. 
A second limit concerns the role played by non-epistemic values in science. There is a growing 
consensus among philosophers of science that even scientific decisions that seem to be purely 
epistemic often require scientists to take non-epistemic values into account.36 A standard example of 
this is inductive risk—i.e., the risk involved in accepting or rejecting a scientific hypothesis (see 
(Rudner 1953) and (Douglas 2009)). The idea is that, since scientific hypotheses are never conclusively 
verified or falsified, whenever scientists accept or reject a hypothesis, they should consider the non-
epistemic consequences of a potential error (i.e., the non-epistemic consequences of accepting a false 
hypothesis or rejecting a true one). For example, if scientists incorrectly accept the hypothesis that the 
widely used herbicide glyphosate is carcinogenic to humans, then this might result in an unnecessary 
ban on glyphosate the substance that might affect crop yields and food prices. If, on the other hand, 
they incorrectly reject the hypothesis, then this might result in a higher rate of incidence of certain 
cancers, which would result in unnecessary deaths and human suffering. When choosing how strict 
the epistemic standards for acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis that glyphosate is a human 
carcinogen, scientist should weigh the potential consequences of error. It seems that, as a society, we 
should try to ensure that the values employed in the process are representative of those held by society 
at large (see, e.g., (Elliott 2017) and (Schroeder forthcoming)). However, this seems to limit the extent 
to which we can have a perfectly efficient division of cognitive labor. 
In general, according to the social approach, the problem of harmful distrust is usually the result 
of the breakdown of an efficient division of epistemic labor caused by a degraded socio-epistemic 
infrastructure. On this view, the issue with the solutions to the problem of harmful distrust put 
forward by the individualistic and the semi-social account is not only that they have unrealistic 
expectations about the resources ordinary citizens are willing and able to devote to sorting through 
the scientific (mis)information they receive or that they rely on an excessively idealized picture of the 
trustworthiness of science, but that their proposed solutions might actually contribute to the problem. 
According to the social approach, to expect ordinary citizens to do more than their basic epistemic 
due diligence on issues such as vaccine safety or climate change (as the individual and semi-social 
approach suggest) is likely to have the unintended effect to further undermining the efficient division 
of epistemic labor. The division of epistemic labor exists exactly so that we do not have to “do our 
own research” on each and every topic that is relevant to our own good, or that of our family, our 
community, our society, or the world. It is practically impossible for each citizen to do their own 
research on such a vast range of topics and, even if it wasn’t, it would be unlikely that most would 
reach warranted conclusions on the basis of such research. In fact, anecdotal evidence seems to suggest 
that people who “do their own research” are the ones who are more likely to reject the scientific 
consensus on specific topics. If a doctor prescribes you a drug, you should be able to assume that the 
drug is relatively effective, that it does not cause side effects, and that the specific batch you are taking 
has undergone a sufficient level of quality control to ensure that the right amount of the medicinal 
ingredient is present, etc. If you had to do your own research on each of these issues before taking a 
prescription drug, then you’ll probably never end up taking that medicine.  
On the social approach, a society that fully trusts science is one that trusts it implicitly. It is a society 
in which science informs public policy and public debate without becoming itself the object of public 
 
36 For an introduction to this topic, see (Elliott 2017). 
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debate. Is this an unattainable ideal, such as the one of a perfectly efficient division of cognitive labor? 
I do not necessarily think so. While a lot of the philosophical literature on public trust in science 
focuses on cautionary tales, we can perhaps learn as much from comparing them to the success stories. 
A rare but very instructive success story is the one that led to the discontinuation of the production 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). At the time, CFCs were widely used as refrigerants in products such as 
refrigerators and air-conditioning units as well as propellants in spray cans. However, in the mid-1970s, 
scientists started to realize that the chlorine released by the decomposition of CFCs in the stratosphere 
was rapidly depleting the stratospheric ozone responsible for absorbing some of the harmful radiation 
from the sun. After the scientists sounded the alarm, political leaders of 27 countries, realizing the 
urgency of the problem, signed the Montreal Protocol in 1987, which heavily regulated the production 
of CFCs. In the meantime, industry developed a number of substitutes of CFCs, including 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are now commonly used, and production of CFCs ceased entirely 
in 1995. 
In the case of CFCs, the global community instantiated something very close to the ideal of a 
perfectly efficient division of epistemic labor—the scientific community was quick to raise the alarm 
about a serious and rapidly-developing environmental problem, the global political community was 
quick to take collective political action on that problem, and the private sector was quick to find a 
technological solution to the problem. The difference between the case of CFCs and the case of 
climate change is striking. Why did the division of epistemic labor work so well in one case and so 
poorly in the other? On a superficial reading, the crucial difference between the two cases is the result 
of luck. In the case of CFCs, the affected industries were able to quickly identify a relatively 
inexpensive technological solution to the problem, while, in the case of global warming, there is no 
technological solution in sight. 
However, to see this merely as a matter of luck seems to miss the more important lesson of 
comparing the success story with the cautionary tale, which is that, in the case of CFCs, private 
economic interests did not have a strong economic incentive to forge an alliance with broadcasters, 
commentators, and politicians to undermine public trust in the relevant science, as in the case of 
climate change.37 The differences between success stories like the one of the ban on CFCs and 
cautionary tales like the one of climate change suggest that one of the main factors that disrupts a 
proper division of epistemic labor is the interference of private economic interests with the 
production, reception, and uptake of scientific knowledge. This hypothesis is supported by the fact 
that, in most of cases of distrust, economic interests played a crucial role in hindering the production, 
reception, and uptake of the relevant bits of scientific knowledge (as, for example, in the many other 
cases discussed in (Oreskes and Conway 2010)). If this hypothesis is correct, then it seems that part 
of the solution to the problem of harmful distrust requires breaking the anti-scientific alliance between 
corporate interests and broadcasters, commentators, and politicians. On the social account, the 
solution of the problem of harmful distrust might have more to do with public policies, such as anti-
lobbying legislation and campaign finance reform, then with trying to persuade ordinary citizens of 
the trustworthiness of science. 
One might argue that we should not overgeneralize on the basis of one success story and a handful 
of cautionary tales. After all, they might argue, economic interests do not seem to play a role in all the 
standard cautionary tales. For example, one might argue that distrust of vaccines cannot be explained 
in terms of economic interests, as no one stands to benefit from lower vaccination rates. However, 
even leaving aside the issue of whether the leading figures of the anti-vaxx movement benefit from 
 
37 Although this doesn’t mean that some of the usual suspects did not try to sow doubt even in that case (see (Oreskes 
and Conway 2010, chap. 4)). What’s remarkable about this case is that strategy did not result in widespread distrust in the 
specific scientific finding. 
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it,38 it seems plausible to claim that economic interests have played a crucial, if less direct, role in 
distrust of vaccines, too. In particular, it is tempting to believe that public trust in biomedical research 
has been eroded by its exceedingly cozy relationship with the pharmaceutical industry and by the many 
scandals to which this relationship has given rise to. This erosion of trust has provided fertile ground 
for distrust in vaccines to propagate.39 
According to the social approach, however, economic interests are not the only social force that 
can negatively affect the trustworthiness of science. Scientists and scientific institutions, for example 
have also contributed to the distrust of science among members of specific communities and social 
groups (including women, people with disabilities, racial and ethnic minorities, gender non-
conforming individuals, etc.) by perpetuating and validating prejudices against members of these 
communities and groups and by perpetrating injustices against them. Examples of this are the distrust 
towards the biomedical profession in sectors of the African-American community (see, e.g., (Boulware 
et al. 2003)) and the gay community (see, e.g., (Hoyt et al. 2012)). The distrust in these communities 
is largely rooted in a history of discrimination and injustice (perhaps best exemplified by the now 
infamous Tuskegee Study in the case of the African-American community (see, e.g., (Brandt 1978)) 
and by the problematic response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the 1980s (see, e.g., (France 2016))). 
In these cases, it seems that improving the social diversity of scientific communities and fostering 
constructive relationship with stakeholders might be a crucial step towards restoring trust in science 
among members of these groups and communities. 
As these all-too-brief remarks suggest, according to the social approach, the problem of harmful 
distrust calls for primarily social solutions, not individualistic solutions. According to social approach, 
if we have to resort to persuading individuals to trust science, it is already too late—we already live in 
a society in which a proper division of epistemic labor has broken down due to a degraded socio-
epistemic infrastructure and, unfortunately, it is extraordinarily difficult to unring the bell of scientific 
misinformation.40 Remedying this situation requires implementing large-scale social and political 
reforms that are aimed at improving the socio-epistemic infrastructure as well as the (actual and 
perceived) trustworthiness of science rather than trying to persuade individual citizens of the 
trustworthiness of science. 
To be clear, the social approach does not necessarily reject all interventions at the individual level. 
However, it emphasizes that the effective interventions at the individual level tend to be social in 
nature as well. For example, while the social approach insists that an adequate account of public trust 
in science should not rely too heavily on the epistemic and non-epistemic resources of individual 
citizens, it still supports efforts to improve the critical thinking skills and the scientific literacy of 
ordinary citizens. However, the social approach emphasizes the fact that even measures that seem to 
be targeting individuals should be understood as social. The scientific literacy and the critical thinking 
skills of individuals can only be improved in a society that is fully committed to providing all of its 
citizens with a high-quality education. The social approach understands the epistemic resources of 
 
38 It is now well-known that Andrew Wakefield, whose now-retracted Lancet article was responsible for giving a veneer 
of scientific respectability to anti-vaccine sentiments, was paid a large sum of money by a group of lawyers who were trying 
to prove vaccines were unsafe (Deer 2006). 
39 See, e.g., (Goldenberg 2021). 
40 The empirical evidence seems to suggest that misinformation and, in particular scientific misinformation, is difficult 
to correct and that attempts to correct might even backfire. For example, an influential study found that, even when 
communication strategies aimed at correcting the mistaken belief that the seasonal flu vaccine can cause the flu are 
successful, the intent to vaccinate might nevertheless decrease as a result (Nyhan and Reifler 2015). If this is true, then the 
best approach is to try to develop better strategies to prevent the spread of disinformation. If, as some studies suggest 
(see, e.g., (Germani and Biller-Andorno 2021)), a handful of influencers play a disproportionate role in spreading 
misinformation online, then the best approach might be to either prevent the spread of disinformation (in an act of 
epistemic paternalism) or find strategies to reduce the credibility of those sources. 
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ordinary citizens to be themselves partially a social product—i.e., they are largely a product of the 
resources that society is willing to invest in the education of its citizens.41 This fact seems to be better 
understood by those who try to undermine public trust in science than by those who try to foster it. 
For example, the campaign to tach creationism in schools as part of a plant to undermine public 
science education as a means to undermining both the public understanding of science and public 
trust in science. 
According to the social approach, however, interventions aimed at improving the scientific literacy 
and critical thinking skills of individual citizens can only play a limited role. This is partly because, as 
the social approach emphasizes, many of the issues to which scientific knowledge is relevant are not 
issues that can be effectively addressed through the actions of individual citizens—they are issues that 
can only be effectively addressed through public policy. While we have already seen a successful case 
of this sort of collective action in the case of the ban on CFCs, the clearest example of this in the 
contemporary context is the case of climate change. Even if we were to convince the vast majority of 
citizens that human activities are causing climate change and that, if not addressed on time, climate 
change is likely to have profound and irreversible consequences on the planet and on humans in 
particular, the challenge of climate change cannot be met solely (or, even, mainly) through individual 
decisions (such as the consumption choices of individuals). Climate change requires large-scale social 
and structural responses that can only be brought about through public policy and international 
agreements (as in the case of the ban of CFCs). Similar considerations apply even in cases that seem 
to be based mostly on individual choices, such as the case of vaccines. Since vaccines are not 
completely effective at the individual level, their effectiveness is partly due to herd immunity. So, even 
what seems to be a personal choice (whether to have one’s children vaccinated) has social 
ramifications—vaccinating one’s kids in a society in which most people do not vaccinate them is only 
going to provide partial protection against the diseases the vaccine is meant to protect against. Finally, 
even cases that seem to involve only individual choices and that have significantly less dramatic social 
consequences might, on closer inspection, require social solutions. Consider, for example, the case of 
flossing discussed by Oreskes (2019, 118–127). Oreskes notes that the best evidence so far of the 
effectiveness of flossing is from studies in which children received flossing by a dental hygienist in 
school. While this might be just an artefact of study design,42 it might also be that flossing is only 
effective (or is significantly more effective) when performed by a dental hygienist. If this is the case, 
then, if we want to follow the evidence where it leads us, then we should conclude that the question 
is not so much how regularly individuals floss at home, but whether people should have more access 
to professional flossing. Oreskes implicitly concedes this when she half-jokingly suggests that flossing 
bars might be part of the solution to the health issues that result from poor dental hygiene. However, 
the truth is that, if the evidence does indeed suggest that the benefits of flossing are only limited to 
professional flossing, then what is required is not simply a change in individual flossing habits, but 
changes to the way we floss as a society. The point is that even cases that seem to involve only 
individual choices that appear to have no social ramifications (such as that of flossing one’s teeth), the 
best solution to the problem might be one that requires new social norms, policies, institutions, or 
services.43 
 
41 If this is true, then it might be that, contrary to what I suggested in n.5 above, all forms of distrust in science are 
ultimately socially harmful, as they are likely to affect negatively the resources that society is willing to invest in the 
education of its citizens or undermine the quality of that education (as illustrated, for example, by the movement to teach 
creationism in schools). 
42 For example, it is possible that studies that are based on people self-reporting their flossing habits systematically 
overestimate how much people actually floss. 
43 I should note that Anderson openly acknowledges the influence of social factors on the beliefs of individual citizens 
and, in particular, of some of the factors I mentioned in this section. However, in spite of this, Anderson’s account is still 
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According to the social approach, public trust in science is primarily a form of social trust that is 
exemplified by an efficient division of epistemic labor between scientists and non-scientists and that 
depends on the state of the socio-epistemic infrastructure of society. While the individual and semi-
social approach focus almost exclusively on interventions at the individual level to solve the problem 
of harmful distrust, the social approach identifies at least four distinct (though sometimes overlapping) 
levels of possible intervention. The first is the individual level. For example, as we have seen, the social 
approach agrees with the individual and the semi-social approach that efforts should be made to 
improve the scientific literacy of ordinary citizens through high-quality public education. The second 
level is the social level. For example, as we have seen, the social approach advocates a greater inclusion 
of stakeholders (and especially from stakeholders from marginalized groups) in decisions about the 
direction of publicly funded scientific research. The third level is at the interface between science and society. 
For example, the social approach advocates for improving the quality of science communication, 
possibly by funding public news sources devoted to providing high-quality science journalism (as 
opposed to the sort of sensationalistic science journalism that is often provided by private media 
sources or a journalism that mistakenly pursues the journalistic norm of balance at all costs (see, e.g., 
(Gerken 2020))). The fourth level is that of scientific communities. For example, society could protect 
science from the undue influence of economic interests by effectively socializing scientific research 
while shielding it from the interference of political interests by letting scientists and a diversity of 
stakeholders be primarily responsible for the allocation of the public funds. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I distinguished three general approaches to public trust in science. I argued that the first 
two approaches, the individual approach and the semi-social approach, conceive of public trust in 
science as primarily based on an individual trust relationship and that, as a result, conceive of the 
solution to the problem of harmful distrust as trying to attempt persuade individual citizens that 
science is trustworthy. I argue that both approaches face two general problems, which I called the 
problem of overidealizing science and that of overburdening citizens. I argued that, to avoid these 
problems, we should adopt a (thoroughly) social approach to public trust in science instead. On this 
approach, public trust in science is primarily based on a social trust relationship between society and 
science. I also argued that a society that fully trust science is one that trusts it implicitly by adopting 
an efficient division of epistemic labor. The problem of harmful distrust arises from a poor socio-
epistemic infrastructure that undermines the efficient division of epistemic labor. To solve the 
problem of harmful distrust we need to try to improve the state of society’s socio-epistemic 
infrastructure, rather than try to persuade citizens to trust science. While this includes interventions at 
the individual level, these interventions need to be supplemented with interventions at the level of 
social groups, of the interface between science and society, and at the level of improving the (actual 
and perceived) trustworthiness of science. 
The outline of the social approach that I provided in this is admittedly just a sketch and many of 
the details will need to be worked out elsewhere (or are already being worked out). However, I hope 
that, in spite of its shortcomings, the outline I provided here contributes to laying the groundwork for 
a unified social approach to public trust in science, an approach that weaves together a number of 
strands of research on the social epistemology of science broadly construed, that stimulates more work 
 
not a (thoroughly) social account of public trust in science, as it still understands public trust in science as primarily based 
on a trust relationship between individual citizens and the scientific community and it regards social factors as interfering 
with the otherwise voluntary and rational epistemic choices of individual citizens. 
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in that direction, and that, hopefully, promotes the adoption of a more constructive and effective 
approach to the problem of harmful distrust. 
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